In this paper, we draw on common-pool resource theory to argue that indigenous territories, when granted full property rights, will be effective at curbing deforestation. Using satellite data, we test the effect of property rights on deforestation between 1982 and 2016. In order to identify causal effects, we combine a regression discontinuity design with the orthogonal timing of homologation. We find that observations inside territories with full property rights show a significant decrease in deforestation, while the effect does not exist in territories without full property rights. While these are local average treatment effects, our results suggest that not only do indigenous territories serve a human-rights role, but they are a cost-effective way for governments to preserve their forested areas. First, obtaining full property rights is crucial to recognize indigenous peoples’ original right to land and protect their territories from illegal deforestation. Second, when implemented, indigenous property rights reduce deforestation inside indigenous territories in the Amazon rainforest, and could provide an important positive externality for Brazil and the rest of the world in terms of climate change mitigation.

Forests serve a crucial role in our fight against climate change. Secondary forests provide important potential for conservation of biodiversity and climate change mitigation. In this paper, we explore whether collective property rights in the form of indigenous territories (ITs) lead to higher rates of secondary forest growth in previously deforested areas. We exploit the timing of granting of property rights, the geographic boundaries of ITs and two different methods, regression discontinuity design and difference-in-difference, to recover causal estimates. We find strong evidence that indigenous territories with secure tenure not only reduce deforestation inside their lands but also lead to higher secondary forest growth on previously deforested areas. After receiving full property rights, land inside ITs displayed higher secondary forest growth than land outside ITs, with an estimated effect of 5% using our main RDD specification, and 2.21% using our difference-in-difference research design. Furthermore, we estimate that the average age of secondary forests was 2.2 y older inside ITs with secure tenure using our main RDD specification, and 2.8 y older when using our difference-in-difference research design. Together, these findings provide evidence for the role that collective property rights can play in the push to restore forest ecosystems.

Protected areas are a cornerstone of global conservation policy, yet those located in remote regions are often viewed as inefficient because they protect forests under little immediate threat. This view assumes static institutions and stable land-use patterns. We show instead that the conservation value of protected areas is dynamic and can rise sharply when environmental governance weakens and deforestation pressure expands. Studying Brazil’s Amazon rainforest during two major institutional shocks—the 2012 Forest Code reform and the 2019–2022 Bolsonaro administration—we find that protected areas prevented large increases in deforestation during periods of institutional decline. Using quasi-experimental evidence from 2004 to 2022, we show that deforestation surged outside protected areas but remained stable within them, particularly in remote regions. Areas previously considered non-additional thus revealed a latent conservation value, functioning as critical buffers against governance erosion. These findings have important implications for global conservation strategies and 30×30 commitments.

Creating protected areas is a key tool of global conservation policy as it promotes biodiversity and ecosystem preservation while also contributing to climate change mitigation. Democratic policymaking creates opportunities and incentives for both resisting and promoting the creation of protected areas. While existing studies highlight the role of resisters, we examine the actors who rise to promote biodiversity conservation in democratic contexts.

In the context of Latin America, we argue that stable democracy facilitated the growth of civil society and the expansion of university education and technical expertise, fostering the emergence of domestic conservation constituencies. These constituencies, including environmental NGOs (ENGOs), activists and experts, attracted international ENGOs seeking opportunities to promote biodiversity conservation by supplying financial and technical resources. Their joint work with public-sector experts promoted the designation of protected areas and the use of biodiversity criteria in their location. 

We test our argument on the establishment of protected areas in Latin America from 1960 to 2016. Quantitative results highlight that periods of stable democracy increased the designation of protected areas as well as their biodiversity value. We provide a process tracing account from fieldwork in Argentina and Ecuador, varying levels of state capacity and differing biome types, highlighting how domestic conservation constituencies evolved post-democratization.

How does deforestation enforcement become politicized? Across Amazonian countries, command-and-control policies are efficient tools to decrease deforestation rates but remain vulnerable to political influence. This dissertation addresses how distinct interest groups influence environmental bureaucrats' ability to effectively sanction violators.

I develop an interest group theory of enforcement where agribusiness actors and environmental transnational advocacy networks (TANs) shape levels of a forestry agency’s enforcement capacity. I define enforcement capacity as the result of presence (field offices and resources) and technology (satellite monitoring). Agribusiness actors, responsible for the majority of deforestation worldwide, leverage their economic and political power to shape agency budgets and key nominations. TANs directly provide resources to forestry agencies, helping bureaucrats bypass political constraints.

I test my theory empirically in Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador, three countries that differ in state capacity and levels of conflict around deforestation. Drawing on over 100 semi-structured interviews conducted during nine months of fieldwork, I trace how these interest groups shaped enforcement institutions from the 1990s through 2023. I then focus on Brazil for a quantitative analysis using original data across 937 municipalities in the Brazilian Amazon from 2000 to 2023.

Results demonstrate that agribusiness interests, measured through soy price shocks, increase deforestation while decreasing enforcement, but TAN presence substantially moderates this effect. I measure the presence of enforcement agencies through municipal exposure to field offices. This exposure increases enforcement outcomes, yet presence is itself endogenous to political-economic pressures. Using counterfactual field office locations, I show that actual enforcement presence became increasingly misaligned with deforestation hotspots as agribusiness power grew, particularly after 2012. A before-and-after analysis of satellite monitoring technology adoption reveals that enforcement actions became more spatially targeted toward deforestation hotspots in areas exposed to field offices.

This research demonstrates that enforcement capacity is endogenous to interest group politics rather than merely reflecting overall state capacity, and reveals how transnational actors can help bureaucracies resist domestic political capture.